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Abstract
This paper tests the theoretically founded hypothesis that the surge of SWF establish-
ments is determined by three main factors: 1) the existence of natural resources profits,
2) the government structure and 3) the ability to invest usefully in the domestic economy.
We test this hypothesis on a sample of 20 countries that established an SWF in the period
1998-2008 by comparing them to the roughly 100 countries that did not set up a fund in
the same period. We find evidence for all three factors. The results suggest that SWFs
tend to be established in countries that run an autocratic regime and have diﬃculties
finding suitable opportunities for domestic investments. We do not find the net foreign
asset position of a country to be similarly related to the explanatory variables, indicating
that the establishment of an SWF is distinct from a national accounting result. We ar-
gue that our results indicate that it is relevant to study how an SWF interacts with the
domestic economy and government policy.
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1. Introduction
Of the 37 countries with at least one Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) today, whose
combined (estimated) assets under management amount to US$6 trillion (US$3.5 trillion
for non-pension funds), 22 countries have established such a fund since 1998, representing
35% of the total assets. Of these 22 countries, 11 are governed by autocratic or less
democratic governments, while such countries represent less than a third of the total
number of countries in the world.2 This surge in government controlled funds can partly
be explained by the rise in commodity prices since the late 1990, which suddenly made
many of the lower income countries’ governments awash with hard currency. These funds
typically hold low risk assets in foreign, often high-income, countries. Standard theory
would advise that one should save temporary income to finance long-term consumption.
However, when a country is characterised by capital scarcity the optimal policy may be
to invest in the domestic economy to trigger long-term economic growth. Therefore the
choice of setting up a fund is determined by economic circumstances of the country, but
also, as the distribution of funds around the world shows, by the political structure in
which this decision takes place.
This paper tests the theoretically founded hypothesis that the surge of SWF estab-
lishments is in equal parts determined by the existence of natural resources profits, the
government structure and the ability to invest profitably in the domestic economy. Nat-
ural resources are a precondition for many SWFs as their exploitation oﬀers substantial
and multi-year funding. Based on this, one would expect to observe many countries with
an SWFs in the world. However, many ‘western’ countries, who had and still have oil
revenues, have not chosen the structure of an SWF to save this income.3 Non-democratic
countries have been more eager to set up such funds. Natural resources exploitation has
often been related to corruption. An SWF may be both an improvement of the past
towards the managements of the resource windfalls as well as a fig leaf.
We compare the existence of an SWF with the possibility to invest at home in (public)
capital. An SWF focused on foreign investments cannot achieve a higher return than the
average world interest rate. In contrast, a long-term horizon in a capital scarce country
would favour investments in human and physical capital at home that would benefit
sustainable economic growth for the long-term future. However, such a long-term horizon
may not exist for autocratic regimes more concerned with their immediate survival in a
country with rivals for leadership. In democratic countries the short term view rooted
2Calculations based on data of the SWF Institute and other sources. ‘Non-democratic’ defined as a
value of 0 or lower at the polity2 scale. See further Section 4
3Of European countries, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, only Norway has famously a sizeable
SovereignWealth Fund, whereas in the US and Canada relatively small local funds exist. The Netherlands
and the UK never set up a similar structure to deal with their North Sea oil revenue. See further the
discussion in section 4
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in election cycles is arguably mitigated by voters’ concern for the generations that follow
them.
We use the sudden emergence of new SWFs to test for the role of economic and
political factors in their establishments using logistic regressions. We argue that the
sudden emergence of SWFs in recent times was triggered by a commodities price boom
that was outside of the control of individual countries. As control group, we use all
countries that have not set up an SWF. Identification relies on strict time separability
where past determinants relate to future establishments. We find that resource rents are
a strong predictor for the establishment of an SWF. However, given our sample, these
rents become less important once we control for a government’s scale of autocracy. Past
expenditures on public goods such on education predict a lower probability of establishing
an SWF in the future indicating that some countries have made a trade-oﬀ between
domestic and foreign investments. We find that natural resources are a special case as the
more general current account does not give the same results. Similarly, the variables that
are robustly related to the probability of establishing an SWF are not similarly related to
the countries foreign asset position. The decision of establishing an SWF can therefore
be interpreted as a policy instrument that is used by certain states, but is not necessarily
in direct correspondence to macro-financial circumstances.
There exists a variety in the qualitative characteristics of SWFs. Some are better
managed and more transparent in their investments and obligations to the government
than others. Many of the recent SWFs have a particularly small asset base relative to the
potential windfall that it could manage, indicating that the fund may be set up primarily
for political reasons rather than for genuine implementation of an optimal saving policy for
future generations. In fact the surge of SWFs establishments in autocratic countries with
little experience of market-based investments gave rise to a lively discussion (especially
in the US) on the potentially international political reasons behind these investments.
This in turn motivated some stakeholders to call for a regime of ‘best practices’ that
could ensure that government-controlled funds invest for economic and financial reasons
reasons in transparent ways.
Therefore, this article contributes to two diﬀerent strands in the literature of resource
management and international finance. On the one hand, our results suggest that SWFs
from non-democratic regimes are probably not established to take over the free world.
Instead, their emergence points to defects at origin: the inability, or unwillingness, to
direct the funds towards improving the domestic economy. Discussions should therefore
continue to include why SWFs hold most of their funds in foreign investments, while
improving the domestic investment climate may reap much higher benefits.
On the other hand, the literature that debates the diﬀerent strategies of harness-
ing resource windfalls may be comforted by the fact that current SWFs appear to take
domestic investment opportunities already into account. Domestic characteristics are a
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strong determinant of SWFs establishments, which are therefore not the result of an ab-
stract and stylised savings decision. Theoretical predictions on the barriers to investment
and rivalrous rent-seeking are also confirmed. This suggests again that the resource rents
are currently not always used for the benefit of the development of the country.
To our knowledge, no paper on SWFs specifically addresses the question of the emer-
gence of the SWFs and of the determinants leading countries to decide to set-up such
funds. The only notable exception is the paper of Aizenman and Glick (2009) which
studies the determinants of the existence (but not the emergence) in 2007 or 2008 of Sov-
ereign Wealth Funds. They find that current account surpluses, fuel exports and foreign
exchange reserves are significant in explaining the existence of an SWF. They also ex-
plore the role of government indicators (proxied by the Worldwide Governance Indicators
of Kaufmann et al., 2009). We improve on their paper with a more carefully economet-
ric set-up, using a dataset with which we are able to draw stronger causal relationships
between economic-political country characteristics and the establishments of SWFs. We
also relate directly to theoretical literature on resource wealth management, and test
various predictions derived from this literature.
2. Literature Review
Our study on the emergence of Sovereign Wealth Funds is at the crossroad of diﬀerent
research fields: one devoted to the SWF phenomenon in general, one devoted to the
management of large current account surpluses (including resource revenues) and one on
optimal foreign exchange reserves.
It is firstly, related to the literature on Sovereign Wealth Funds in general. Two core
sub-fields have emerged over last decade, a finance one and a political one. On the finance
side, one question is whether such massive funds could have an impact on the financial
markets, and whether this eﬀect is good (enhanced liquidity, long-run investment hori-
zons) or bad (systemic risks, volatility). On the one hand, Beck and Fidora (2008) and
Sun and Hesse (2009) evaluate the short-term financial impact of SWFs on selected public
equity markets in which they invest and found no significant destabilizing eﬀect. On the
contrary, Kotter and Lel (2008) find a significant, and positive, return announcement ef-
fect. In et al. (2013) and Gomes (2008) on the other hand explore their long-run stabilising
role. The question of their performance given their specific governance (political influ-
ences, long-term investment horizon, opacity) has also been explored (Bernstein et al.,
2013; Ang, 2012). On the political side, some specific investments gave rise to hot polit-
ical debate on whether such politically-flavoured investors could be a threat to national
security (Kirshner, 2009) and could indirectly encourage capital account protectionism
(Johnson, 2007). The scope of this branch of papers relates to business practices such as
corporate governance and ethics. Monk (2009) argues that it is rather perceptions that
recipient countries may have of the SWFs, rather than actual past (mis-)behaviour that
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drives the general negative attitude against them. The SWFs are not helping by being
generally opaque on their governance structure, investment objectives and strategy.
Remarkably, these studies often discard the domestic factor (from the perspective of
the SWFs), and do not question why a government establishes an SWF and uses it to in-
vest abroad rather than using the revenues to invest in its own economy. Nevertheless, the
background and establishments of funds is analysed for instance by Yi-Chong and Bahgat
(2010) as well as by NGO’s/Academic research institutes.4 From such sources it is already
evident that political mechanisms, especially within countries, is a major driver for the
decision to establish an SWF. We take a more macro-approach in our research by not
only looking at countries that have established an SWF but by comparing these countries
with those that have not.
The second research field, on the best management of large current account surpluses
(including resource revenues), has two schools. On the one hand a classical school which
advises saving as much as possible in order to reap long term, but incremental, benefits
(Hartwick, 1977), and on the other hand those that argue for additional consumption
and domestic investments in order to reach a higher growth path (Collier et al., 2009;
Venables, 2010; van der Ploeg and Venables, 2011). This last school sees the emergence
of an SWF as a final option after domestic opportunities have run out. Additionally,
the eﬃciency of saving a windfall may be related to the domestic government structure.
Van der Ploeg (2010b) argues theoretically that in more fractionalized societies, com-
petition for rents makes a fund more likely. Indeed, looking at any list of SWFs, it is
apparent that authoritatively-run governments dominate. The existence of investment
funds run by non-democratic governments in turn ignited a debate on their policy of
foreign investments. We return to these studies in more detail below to formulate some
hypotheses.
Thirdly, the literature on optimal management of foreign exchange reserves oﬀers a
very relevant perspective on the emergence of SWFs. Rodrik (2006) shows that the excess-
ive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by many developing countries has a cost in
terms of yields, that could amount to close to 1 % of (their respective) GDP. This brought
some central banks with large reserves to consider alternative more risky investments in
equity, private equity markets and to progressively evolve into de facto SWFs. This is
the case of the Saudi Arabian central bank (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency or SAMA)
which was estimated to have 15% of its holdings in equity in 2007 (Diwan, 2009). As
second example, the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchanges (SAFE) estab-
lished a subsidiary in Hong-Kong in 1997 to make purchases in foreign equity investment.
As third example, the Swiss Central Bank announced in 2010 to have more than 10% of
4See for instance the fund profiles given by http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/
natural-resource-funds/, created in cooperation with the National Resource Governance Institute.
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its foreign holdings in equity (Jordan, 2012). Aizenman and Glick (2010) provide a frame-
work to assess the optimal strategy for asset class diversification by central banks and
SWFs and, given their respective objectives, to illustrate how their respective strategies
are aﬀected by various parameters such as the volatility of equity returns or the total
amount of foreign assets available for management. Our perspective diﬀers as we take the
position of a government rather than of a (independent) central bank. For the latter the
objective function is expressed in terms of monetary or exchange rate stability, whereas
we focus on what would benefit the ruler of the country.
Our study borrows from these three fields, bringing a new contribution to the SWF
literature, by looking how the resource revenue management and the foreign exchange
reserve management can help to understand the emergence of SWFs.5
3. Testable implications of theory
There is an extensive recent literature that investigates diﬀerent factors that may
influence an optimal consumption, savings and investment policy for countries that face a
resource exploitation windfall or may expect to do so in the future. Some of these factors
are purely economic, in the sense that they relate to the structure of an economy, including
the intertemporal preferences of the decision maker, and its relations with the rest of the
world. Other studies relate policy decision to domestic politics and the objectives of self-
interested rulers (see Collier et al., 2009; Collier, 2010, for reviews). We expect that both
types of factors will interact with the establishment of SWFs. We therefore require a
careful consideration of the relevant factors and their predictions.
Before discussing these factors in detail, we need to note that the data allow us only
an imperfect view of decisions. We observe the establishment of an SWF, but generally,
the characteristics of those SWF, notably its size, are notoriously unreliable for the most
interesting cases. In order to have the widest scope of data, we observe the most rudi-
mentary aspect, the establishment and existence of a fund. Although we may interpret
such establishment as, at least the intention of, increased savings, the recently established
SWFs vary enormously in size irrespective of what could be expected from the size of
resource rents available. We discuss this further in Section 6. We need to take account of
these limitations of the data in formulating testable hypothesis.6
H1: Resource rents increase the probability of observing an SWF.
This hypothesis is the most obvious one. Having the means functions as a precondition
to the ability to save. The reason that resource rents may in particular endure government
5Related but approaching the question on rents and savings from a diﬀerent angle is the study of
Andersen et al. (2013), which looks at financial flows to tax havens and relate this to variation in rents
as well as governance variables.
6As usual, the test performed on the data are inverted in the sense that we test that a certain factor
plays no role.
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saving, compared to, say, manufacturing exports surpluses is largely due to ownership. In
the majority of countries the (national or regional) government maintains an important
stake in the production, including through partial ownership, even when private and/or
foreign firms are partners in the exploitation process. Empirically, this hypothesis also
helps to identify in the estimation which among all countries in the world could potentially
set up a fund.
H2: Barriers to domestic investment will lead to higher foreign savings.
Capital scarce countries may have a lot of potential in development, but certain bar-
riers in the state of the economy prohibit their immediate exploitation. It may be argued
that a country starting from a low base may not have the capacity to absorb any size
of domestic investment instantaneously. Capacity for such absorption (e.g. a gradual in-
crease in a transport network, educating teachers to scale up general education) takes
time and a too large increase of investment will reduce the marginal return of these
(van der Ploeg and Venables, 2013; van der Ploeg, 2012). It is not obvious to measure
something like ‘capacity to absorb investments’. We will primarily capture this by past
education expenditures. We intend to capture with this variable the ability to absorb
additional investments in public capital in general and education in particular. Past ex-
penditures then measure the fact that there is already some infrastructure present in the
country and consequently does not need to start from scratch. Therefore, past education
expenditures are expected to be negatively associated with the establishment of a Sov-
ereign Wealth Fund. Other variables may be able to capture the same mechanism. For
instance, past spending on infrastructure might be such a variable. Unfortunately, not
much comparable data for such specific ‘beneficial’ public capital are available, outside of
education.
H3: Autocratic regimes are more likely to establish an SWF relative to democratic ones.
The third major determinant we like to test relates to the political determinants of
savings decisions in resource rich countries. As observed above, many of the SWFs appear
to be established in countries that have less than full democratic systems. And although
this makes for an easy test to implement in a regression, the underlying mechanism is
less clear. Several authors have looked at the dynamics of decision making in government
regimes that are subject to patronage and between group rivalry. Robinson et al. (2006;
2014) introduce a model where a ruler can use government employment to support his
power-base and improve the chances to stay in power. When his future value of staying
in power is large enough, for instance through the expectation of future resource price
rises, he will aim to stay in power through patronage and will not aim to raid all resources
immediately. Although their model does not allow for the option of a government savings
fund, we may postulate that as long as SWFs is not fully independently managed from the
government, it can serve as ruler personal savings account. Therefore, a ruler that expects
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to stay in power for a while, may very well set up an SWF in anticipation of being able
to use at least some of the proceeds for private use in the future (or for his hereditaries).
When the choice is between a national savings fund and domestic investments a ruler may
prefer a fund that he controls over investments in irretrievable public capital, which in the
best case may only increase tax returns over the very long run. This is a similar mechanism
since the discount rate applied to the future determines the choice of investments.
Van der Ploeg (2010a) models a fractionalised society where various groups exploit
partially common resources that have ill-defined property rights. Since the resources are
partially shared, such a society will over-extract and save too little. Although many auto-
cratically ruled countries appear to have a diverse underlying society consisting of rival
groups, we do not observe that such groups actually have the ability to extract resources
for themselves.7 Hence, when the autocrat enjoys a monopoly on resource extraction he
will chose for a more sustainable pattern of consumption which is accompanied by higher
savings (van der Ploeg, 2010a, p. 40).
Both studies suggest that greater ‘accountability’ as well as well-defined property
rights are instrumental for optimal behaviour of consumption, savings and investment in
terms of national welfare, i.e. an SWF. The interesting counter example is here that many
democratic countries, both in our sample and in the past, have not set up an SWF, or
if they did, a remarkably small one.8 We will explore the political channels through the
diﬀerent components of regime and government characteristics included in the PolityIV
dataset (Marshall et al., 2006).
This hypothesis is also the most closely related to what is known as the natural re-
source curse hypothesis, which relates institutions to the management and use of natural
resource revenues and ultimately economic growth and development (see for instance
Sachs and Warner, 2001; Mehlum et al., 2006; van der Ploeg, 2011). Note however, that
we do not provide a specific test regarding this hypothesis since both economic and insti-
tution variables will be used as explanatory variables for the establishment of an SWF.
Nevertheless, our results can potentially be used in future research to identify one aspect
of natural resource management through a fund and how this relates to institutions and
economics.
H4: Debt reduction serves as an alternative to establishing an SWF.
Apart from investing in public capital, a government that has a substantial foreign
debt may choose to pay this oﬀ first before setting up an SWF. In this way, paying oﬀ
debt is similarly an investment in the public good of a sound national account. Rather
7Although the case of Iraq, with the autonomous production of the Kurds, as well as the case of shared
pools between Sudan and South Sudan, come to mind. In many other societies the ruling autocrat will
aim to monopolise the resource exploitation
8The notable exception being Norway. The UK did not set up such a fund for its own North sea oil,
while it set up the very first of such a fund for Kuwait before its independence.
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than the debt position it may be the borrowing costs that matter for the choice of paying
down the debt (van der Ploeg and Venables, 2011). However, to our knowledge there
is no comprehensive dataset available that collects government borrowing costs for the
entire world.9 We will test this hypothesis instead with measures of the debt stock, and
indirectly with the measures on the net financial asset position of the country.
H5: When resource windfalls are subject to future demand and price uncertainty more
should be saved.
Van der Ploeg (2010a) analyses diﬀerent sources of uncertainty on the national saving
decision. In particular, given a government objective of minimising swings in income
and spending, uncertainty originating from future resource price movements (assumed to
be determined outside the power of the resource exporting country) and demand, ought
to lead to additional savings. The resources should also be extracted more quickly, but
the objective is to transform the wealth under ground in financial wealth with a more
predictable future income flow. Sometimes such additional savings relating to mitigating
resource rents volatility are known as a volatility fund since they target that aspect of the
income specifically, rather than dealing with the intergenerational distribution problem
(van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2013). Other sources of uncertainty, in particular
with respect to the exact value of the resources still under the ground would induce a
slower exploitation, but not a particular eﬀect on the savings decision.
There are additional economic factors that can be captured in the hypotheses presented
above. For instance, a high income country presumably faces no barriers to invest at
home, but simultaneously may not find larger returns domestically relative to abroad.
Such countries are already economically and financially integrated with the rest of the
world and the additional windfall would require taking into account other aspects besides
the intergenerational problem of consumption. Therefore, as long as resource rents are
owned by the government, we expect that a high income country will use the opportunity
of windfall revenue to set up a well-run SWF. However, it may very well decide to shift
the revenue directly or indirectly to its citizens who may save or spend, but in any case
will likely not do so through an SWF.
This point may also be related to what is known as Dutch disease, a mechanism
through which natural resource exports can under certain conditions appreciate a currency
and drive out other export sectors. This mechanism strongly relies on a the ‘spending
eﬀect’ of the export revenues in the domestic economy (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden,
1984). Therefore, countries worried about this eﬀects may decided to set up an SWF
9The ‘JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index’ goes a long way in this respect, but not all rates for
the countries included are measured in the same way, and the dataset excludes all non-emerging markets,
particularly developed countries.
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in order to regulate how much of the revenues can be used over time. However, not all
countries may face such issues and a Sovereign Wealth Fund is not the only solution.
Open capital markets and labour migration combined with flexible labour markets can
significantly accommodate Dutch disease eﬀects (Raveh, 2013; Beine et al., 2014).
Anticipation of a future windfalls, with reserves proven but exploitation still some
years oﬀ, would induce a preparation period in which a government can borrow to finance
consumption and domestic investment today. The borrowing would be reversed to paying
of the debt and potentially net savings once the revenues are realised. So an SWF is not
necessary set up once revenues are flowing since the revenues are firstly targeted to cover
past borrowing. Therefore, the mechanism of anticipation can be indirectly captured by
two variables we already discussed. The past debt position as well as past education
expenditures may have been occurring exactly in anticipation of future revenues and are
predicted to be negatively related to the establishment of an SWF.
Expectations of future commodity price increases, decreasing costs of extraction may
also lead to decreasing or even negative savings (van der Ploeg, 2010a). We cannot test the
relevance of these aspects for two reasons. Firstly, future commodity prices are presumably
set at the world market and thus shared by all countries. The lack of variation between
the countries will then not allow us to observe this eﬀect. Decreasing costs of extraction
could be varying by country, in the case it depends on local geography rather than global
technology, but to our knowledge there does not exist a reliable measure of this for the
full range of countries that we take into account, including ones that have no resources.
In short, we aim to test the five hypotheses set out above, which relate both to
economic and political factors in the decision to set up an SWF. However, we acknowledge
that some variables that serve to capture the factors may actually be working through
multiple mechanisms.
4. Data and Methodology
The point of this research is essentially to understand why some countries have an SWF
and others not. An SWF may be an indicator of a sensible national savings decision,
as often related in the theory discussed above. However, as we will see, the decision
to establish an SWF is not as strongly related to what we can observe as a national
savings position, i.e. some countries may very well implement savings decision outside
the institution of an SWF, while others appear to establish an SWF for appearances only.
Since some countries established an SWF and others not, we have a classic binary set-up
that can be approached by a logit regression. We exploit the 1998-2008 window, where 20
countries established an SWF, to explore the role of a range of potential determinants, as
measured at the beginning of the window (1998, or the average over several years ending
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Figure 1: Establishment of SWFs: the 1998-2008 wave
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in 1998).10
Information on the years of establishment of the SWFs and on the fund management
characteristics were collected from Truman (2008).11 Since we look at the country level,
where necessary we summarise the data over the diﬀerent funds. For instance, for the
establishment data we take the earliest year available, for total funds we take the sum
over all the funds. As reported in Table 1, 20 countries set up their first SWF between
1998 and 2008. The largest, whose assets exceed $100 billion end of 2013, are China,
Qatar, Kazakhstan and Russia. It is striking to note that this 98-08 wave was relatively
global, with 2 European, 6 African, 9 Asian and 3 North and South American countries.
Our sample of 20 countries includes 32 of the 50 largest funds (as measured in terms of
assets at the end of 2013).
Figure 1 plots the number of Sovereign Wealth Funds over time as well as a measure
of commodity prices. Starting in 1970, there were seven Sovereign Wealth Funds. During
the 1970s through the 1990s every once and a while a new fund was established. We
10We estimated the models using several window lengths of the past, without much qualitative diﬀer-
ences. These results are available on request
11And completed by information collected on the website of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, as
of 15 January 2014
11
observe a sharp rise in the frequency that funds were established by the end of the 1990s
throughout the first decade of 2000. This pattern coincides with a sharp rise in the price
level of many commodities, including oil, metals and agricultural products. The vertical
shaded area depicts the time frame from which we draw our independent variables in
order to explain the SWFs that were established during 1999-2008. There was a sharp
drop in commodity prices around 2008 which again appears to coincide with a sudden
stop in new establishments. After 2008, a new boom is observed, which again coincides
with new SWF establishments. For this reason we argue that the sudden emergence of
many SWF was triggered for a great part by a commodity price boom, which we believe
to be exogenous to individual countries. In turn, with the combination of data largely
from before the boom, allows us to identify the relevant variables, without necessarily
having to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Since our study focuses on the emergence of SWFs over the 1998-2008 period, we do
not include in our study those funds established before 1998. This is on the one hand to
establish causation, as the regressors we use are obtained for 1998 or earlier. On the other
hand, our discussion on SWFs particularly relates to the emergence of newly established
funds, rather than those that have been around for a long time. Nevertheless, results
generally continue to hold with the inclusion of the older funds. Additionally, we can
reflect to what extent the result for the new funds are in line with the history of the
establishment of earlier established funds.
The main funds established before 1998 are reported in Table 2. Our sample does not
include the Norwegian SWF (established in 1990 with about US$818 billion in 2014), The
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority SWF (established in 1976 with about $627 billion in
2014), the Kuwait Investment Authority (first SWF, established in 1953 with about $386
billion in 2014), the Hong-Kong Monetary Authority (established in 1993 with about
$326, 7 billion), The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (established in
1981 with about $285 billion) and Temasek Holdings of Singapore (established in 1974,
with $173,3 billion).
As suggested in the previous section, the main potential determinants are related to
revenue inflows, typically natural resource rents (oil, gas, metals, phosphates), measured
in percentage of GDP. We also need to control for the political institutions. We do so
by creating an indicator variable equal to 1 if the value of polity2 democracy score is
between -10 and 0 (more autocratic), and 0 if the score is above 0 (more democratic)
(Marshall et al., 2006). Many oil-exporting countries fall in the autocratic regime cat-
egory, but note that our sample is not focused on oil and gas, but all commodities. This
interaction between resource rents and a country governance structure is discussed in the
literature and we look whether we can find a relation of this in the data by including
an interaction term between the polity2 dummy variable and the natural resource rents
variable.
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Table 1: Countries with first SWF established in the 1998-2008 wave
Country Year Pension Assets Name
Algeria 2000 No 77.2 Revenue Regulation Fund
Australia 2006 Yes 88.7 Australian Future Fund
Azerbaijan 1999 No 34.1 State Oil Fund
Chile 2006 No 22.2 Social and Economic Stabilization
Fund (15.2). Pension Reserve Fund
(7)
China 2000 No 735.8 China Investment Corporation
(575.2). National Social Security
Fund (160.6)
France 2008 Yes 25.5 Strategic Investment Fund
Gabon 1998 No 0.4 Gabon Sovereign Wealth Fund
Iran 2000 No 54 Oil Stabilization Fund
Ireland 2001 Yes 19.4 National Pensions Reserve Fund
Kazakhstan 2000 No 166.4 Samruk-Kazyna JSC (77,5), Kaza-
khstan National Fund (68,9), Na-
tional Investment Corporation (20)
Korea 2005 No 56.6 Korea Investment Corporation
Libya 2006 No 65 Libyan Investment Authority
Mexico 2000 No 6 Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund of
Mexico
New Zealand 2003 Yes 19.3 NZ Superannuation Fund
Nigeria 2003 No 1 Excess Crude Account
Qatar 2005 No 170 Qatar Investment Authority
Russia 2008 No 187.4 National Welfare Fund (88), Re-
serve Fund (86,4), Russian Direct
Investment Fund (13)
Sudan 2002 No . Oil Revenue Stabilization Account
Trinidad and Tobago 2007 No 5 Heritage and Stabilization Fund
Venezuela 1998 No . National Development Fund, Mac-
roeconomic Stabilization Fund
Note: We do not consider the date of establishment of the SAFE for China as reference date for
the country, since it mostly acted a passive manager of foreign exchange reserves until 2000. Same
justification for SAMA in Saudi Arabia. The column “Year” refers to the date of establishment of
the SWFs. The Yes in the column “Pension” stands for Pension assets with a weight superior to 50%
of the total country funds (based on Truman (2008)). The column “Assets” reports (cumulated)
country assets size in billion US$
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Table 2: Top-10 SWFs by assets not included in our sample (establisment before 1998)
Rank Country SWF Assets Year
1 Norway Government Pension Fund - Global 818 1990
3 Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 627 1976
6 Kuwait Kuwait Investment authority 386 1953
7 Hong-Kong HK Monetary Authority 326.7 1993
8 Singapore Government Singapore Investment
Corp.
285 1981
9 Singapore Temasek Holdings 173.3 1974
Note: The “Rank” and “Assets” columns refer to the ranking and assets (in million US$) of
the SWFs according to the www.swfinstitute.org ranking, as of December 2013. The column
”Year” refers to the date of establishment of the SWFs. The swfinstitute.org ranking also lists
the Saudi Arabian SAMA and Chinese SAFE as top ten SWFs. These SWFs existed before
1998, but were acting as passive managers of the foreign exchange reserves. They only switched
to a more active asset management (and only “deserve” the label SWF) after 1998.
Our theoretical considerations above suggest that SWFs are more likely to get estab-
lished in those countries that cannot use these funds profitably at home. Although return
on investment in capital scarce countries ought to be high, the risk profile and barriers
make actual investments diﬃcult. We thus look at two variables that may proxy for this
factor: a measure of education spending and a measure of general government expendit-
ures, both expressed in % of GDP. Having sizeable education expenditures should indicate
the ability of a government to invest in public capital domestically, firstly through public
education, but it could very well indicate a broader ability for domestic public invest-
ments, such as infrastructure. The attention that has historically been given to the role
of education in development makes that international comparable data on education ex-
penditures is now available for most countries, as opposed to spending on other types of
public capital. We finally also include the log of GDP per capita to control for the general
income level of the country.
We define the left-hand side variable as a country dummy equal to 1 if the country
established a first SWF in the 1998-2008 window and to 0 otherwise.12 The variables on
the right-hand side are the potential determinants of the emergence of SWFs, as measured
at the very beginning of the window. To mitigate a year-specific eﬀect, we computed the
determinants as 5-year averages over 1994-1998 (similarly to Aizenman and Glick, 2009).13
In Table 3 descriptive statistics of the main variables that we use are presented, divided
over countries that do not set up a fund in the period of analysis versus those that do.14
12Note that Aizenman and Glick (2009) do not define their dummy the same way. They define the
country dummy as equal to 1 if an SWF exists in 2007/2008, independently of the date of establishment.
Their focus is not precisely on the emergence of SWFs.
13Taking the average will also help to full in some gabs of missing data, allowing to increase the sample.
This is especially relevant for models that include data on government expenditures.
14Table A-2 in the Appendix describes in more details each variable and its source.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Non-SWF countries (future) SWF countries
Variable obs mean st. dev obs mean st. dev equal
1(Polity2<0) 144 0.31 0.46 16 0.50 0.52 0.17
Resource rents (% GDP) 144 6.75 11.55 16 17.45 13.93 0.01
Comm. Ex. (% Trade) 134 50.51 28.00 16 67.37 29.23 0.04
Log GDP/cap. 144 8.50 1.16 16 9.11 0.83 0.01
Edu. exp. (% GDP) 108 4.57 4.26 11 3.49 0.81 0.03
Gov. cons. (% GDP) 133 16.23 6.52 16 13.18 3.73 0.01
Curr. acc. (% GDP) 127 −5.27 8.34 15 −2.53 7.04 0.00
Debt (% GDP) 132 75.36 57.54 16 53.43 53.14 0.18
NFA (% GDP) 131 −0.74 2.19 16 −0.45 0.66 0.14
FX res. (% GDP) 132 0.11 0.09 16 0.09 0.06 0.26
σ2(GDP) 144 0.36 0.15 16 0.36 0.19 0.43
σ2(Resource rents) 133 0.53 0.46 16 0.55 0.53 0.91
Note: Non-SWF countries are those countries that do not have and do not establish a fund before
2008, future SWF countries are those that have no SWF before 1998 but do establish one in 1999-
2008. The last column indicates the p-value of a t-test on the equality of means. 1(Polity2<0) is
an indicator variable, Comm. EX. is the commodity exports, Edu. exp. is education expenditures,
Gov. cons. is government consumption, curr. acc. is current account, NFA is net financial assets,
FX res is foreign exchange reserves, σ2(GDP) is the standard deviation of GDP per capita over
1978-1998, σ2(Resource rents) is same measure for resource rents. For more data details see Table
A-2.
We find that future SWF appear to diﬀer significantly from non-SWF countries in some
of the main variables that we use to test our hypothesis, except for regime type, debt,
assets and volatility.
To summarise, we include in our benchmark regressions, natural resource rents, govern-
ment expenditures (as collected from the World Bank Statistics database and expressed in
1994-1998 averages) and a dummy based on the polity2 measure on autocracy-democracy.
The benchmark estimating equation can be represented as follows
SWFi = logit(β1Rentsi + β2 log(GDPpci) + β3Non-democrati + β4GovExpi) + ui, (1)
where SWFi represents a dummy of having established an SWF in the period 1998-2008,
while the other regressors indicate past country characteristics that have preceded this
decision. We will vary the exact combination and form of the right hand side variables.
Note that the four independent variables correspond to the hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 defined
above. We include log(GDPpci) as a general control variable for a country’s development.
For each regression we will indicate the number of SWFs in the sample, the Pseudo-R2
and the log-likelihood.
Given that we allow for the establishment of an SWF in a 10-year period, those estab-
lished early in this period may have a stronger relation to economic and other variables
during the 1994-1998 period than those that are established 10 years later. Additionally,
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there is a great heterogeneity between funds, whereby some funds appear to be estab-
lished for symbolic reasons only as they hold very little assets, while others rank among
the biggest in the world. The binary variable for existence is therefore a rather crude
measure.
However, alternative setups may have even greater drawbacks. One alternative is to
shorten the window of establishments, for instance by taking only 3 or 5 years since 1998.
This would reduce the number of observed positives, and thus a much narrower scope for
the interpretation of the results. Alternatively, a panel setup is possible, whereby past
data relates to the set-up of a fund in any time. However, this is not appropriate for
our dataset and the question we aim to answer, since a conditional logic estimations (a
method to substitute out country fixed determinants) can only exploit information from
those countries that change from having no fund to having one somewhere during the
time-span we analyse. Therefore this estimator is unable to compare those countries that
set-up a fund with those that do not.15
5. Results
The regressions reported in Table 4 lead to three observations. First, a country must
be rich (log GDP per capital positive and significant) or have natural resource rents (pos-
itive and significant) to establish an SWF (being rich with resources also works naturally).
Unsurprisingly, funding matters. Second, the level of education spending and of general
government consumption aﬀect negatively the probability of establishing an SWF. This
confirms what was suggested by theory; higher domestic level of investment make future
domestic investments more profitable and thereby increase the opportunity cost of estab-
lishing an SWF. Finally, political regime matters. Autocratic countries are more likely
to establish an SWF than democratic ones. In addition, the interaction term between
the dummy for autocratic power and natural resource rents is significant, negative and
of an amplitude close to the coeﬃcient on the natural resource rent variable. The inter-
pretation is that the role of natural resource is zero for autocratic countries. In other
words, natural resources only matter in democratic countries. Autocratic countries tend
to establish SWFs, irrespective of actual need to do so.16
In economic theory one can make a distinction between government consumption
and domestic investment. In reality it is not easy to observe the diﬀerence. For in-
stance, expenditures on eduction are clearly government spending that can be counted
as consumption, but count as investment for long-term growth in our interpretation. In
15In addition, the conditional logic depends on a binary variable that is conditionally uncorrelated over
time. This is certainly violated in our dataset since countries typically do not wind down a fund but keep
it for the remainder of the foreseeable future.
16Table B-2 in the appendix gives results for interaction of rents with the other variables. These
results indicate that the interaction with regime type is indeed the most important, and results cannot
be attributed to some general non-linearity of the rents data.
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Table 4: Benchmark
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
swf swf swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.052* 0.223*** 0.269*** 0.262*** 0.252*** 0.245***
(0.027) (0.053) (0.064) (0.058) (0.066) (0.061)
Log GDPpc 0.953*** 1.403*** 1.714*** 1.954*** 1.458*** 1.756***
(0.213) (0.311) (0.421) (0.390) (0.410) (0.438)
Non-democrat 1.009 3.237*** 3.608** 3.926*** 2.601** 3.279*
(0.852) (0.959) (1.496) (1.172) (1.262) (1.782)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.203*** -0.264*** -0.241*** -0.219*** -0.222***
(0.057) (0.075) (0.066) (0.072) (0.082)
Edu. exp. -0.630** -0.509
(0.261) (0.422)
Gov. cons. -0.249***
(0.071)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.073* -0.198
(0.043) (0.123)
Constant -11.552*** -16.846*** -17.431*** -18.468*** -16.461*** -16.037***
(2.125) (3.292) (4.084) (3.545) (4.284) (3.828)
Observations 160 160 119 149 115 115
n. SWFs 16 16 11 16 11 11
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.34 0.42
ll -42.57 -35.63 -22.98 -29.66 -24.04 -20.89
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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contrast, there might be plenty of government expenditures that we should interpret as
(wasteful) consumption rather than genuine attempts for long-term growth. This may
include extending the public sector for patronage reasons, expenditures on luxury goods
for government oﬃcials etc. On the other hand, money can only be spent once. There-
fore, any government expenditures will decrease the amount available for savings. The
negative coeﬃcient fits both the story of current consumption and long-term investments.
The question then is whether we can disentangle the two mechanisms.
In our dataset, there is more data available for the general government account than
the more specific educational expenditures or even other part of the government budget.
In the model, individually both relate negatively to the establishment of SWFs (models
3 and 4), but their coeﬃcients diﬀer, with past educational expenditures indicating a
stronger negative eﬀect on the probability of setting up an SWF compared to government
consumption. Government expenditures include already the expenditures on education.
When we include government expenditures excluding education we find a smaller and less
significant coeﬃcient. When we include both education and other government expendit-
ures both are individual insignificant, but an F-test on the two coeﬃcients to be jointly
zero is rejected at 1% (p-value is 0.004), indicating that there is still some correlation
among the two indicators. This further confirms our hypothesis that SWFs may be the
result of the lack or unwillingness to invest domestically in a new economy.17
In order to understand the size of the eﬀects we estimate marginal eﬀects for model
3 over several cases. Table 5 presents the results. The first column gives the result of a
linear probability model (LPM) using the same sample and model as the other columns,
but presenting only the relevant coeﬃcients. Column two gives the figures for the average
marginal eﬀect over the sample using the logit. These coeﬃcients can be interpreted
as the eﬀect of a unit change of x on the probability of observing an SWF, similar to
the coeﬃcients of the LPM. For instance, an increase of resource rents by 1% would
increase the probability of observing an SWF by 0.85%. This is a sizeable eﬀect for those
countries that experience a significant boom. The income figure implies that rising income
per capita strongly increases the probability of observing a fund, which underlines that
a fund is principally a savings instrument. The coeﬃcient on expenditure on education
indicates that a 1% increase in educational expenditures decreases the probability of
observing an SWF in the future. These two factors, income and education, underline
the opposing eﬀects of saving due to increased income and domestic investment for the
benefit of economic development. Relative to the LPM, the estimated eﬀects from the
17The availability of data cannot be assumed to be completely random in this case. Data on educational
expenditures is much scarcer. Those countries that produce such data are probably more likely to value
such figures, independent of the actual value, implying that there exist already a certain mechanism
for proper government spending. Countries with regimes that aim to hide as much as possible where
government money is spent would drop out of the sample.
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Table 5: Marginal Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM AME democrat. non-democrat.
Rents 2.83∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.64) (0.25) (0.33) (0.22)
log GDPpc 10.35∗∗∗ 9.11∗∗∗ 7.47∗∗∗ 13.39∗∗∗
(2.22) (2.42) (2.62) (4.94)
Edu. exp. −0.55 −3.35∗∗ −2.75∗ −4.92∗
(0.38) (1.70) (1.53) (2.80)
Note: LPM is linear probability model on the same set of variables. The other
columns are based on the model in Table 4, model 3. AME: Average Marginal
Eﬀect.
logic model of rents is smaller, while that on education bigger, but the magnitude and
sign are broadly in line.
In columns 3 and 4 we compare the coeﬃcients over democratic and non-democratic
governments. This comparison allows to show the interactive eﬀect that this government
characteristic has on all the determinants due to the non-constant marginal eﬀects the
logit model. The marginal eﬀects for democratic governments are very similar to the
average marginal eﬀects, although the eﬀect of resource rents is slightly decreased, while
for income it is slightly increased. For non-democratic countries however the marginal
eﬀects are very diﬀerent. The estimates indicate that resource rents are not related to
the establishment of a fund, in line with the observation in Table 4. Apparently there
are enough countries in the sample that establish a fund while our data indicates that
their rents are only marginal in period before.18 Income per capita still has a significant
coeﬃcient. The eﬀect on resource rents disappears in line with the observation in Table
4. The estimate for educational expenditures is larger compared to democratic regimes
indicating that the trade-oﬀ between public expenditures or savings is much stronger in
autocratic regimes relative to democratic countries.
Starting from these benchmark results we explore the sample in five directions. Firstly,
we will look at alternative regressors on top of our benchmark regression, including those
that belong to Hypotheses 4 and 5 (the roles of debt and uncertainty respectively).
Secondly, we look at some alternative measures for the independent variables. Thirdly, we
try to explore through which channel the political factor aﬀects the decision. Fourthly, we
change the dependent variable from the binary indicator to variables indicating the asset
position of a country. This will allow us to understand further to what extent an SWF is
18This could also be because some countries were forward looking, setting up a fund before the rents
started flowing
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a function of economic-financial variables. Finally, we use duration analysis, which asks
a slightly diﬀerent question but oﬀers strikingly consistent results.
AppendixB oﬀers some further robustness results with alternative estimations. For
instance, Table B-1 explores the possibility that log GDP per capita and education are
not linear in the model, but perhaps reverse sign dependent on their level. There is some
evidence that the eﬀect of log GDP per capita follows a inverse-U shape. The shape
would suggest that both the very poor and very rich are less likely to set up a fund,
which goes counter the predictions of the theoretical models. The eﬀect of education is
similarly inverse-U shaped, changing sign at 3% of GDP, suggesting that too low education
expenditures would induce an SWF, but that around the mean (around 4% in the sample)
countries appear to be more likely to invest in education (and potentially other investments
correlated with it), then to save proceeds in an SWF. Table B-5 and Figure B-1 explore
whether the results are driven by sample selection or outliers, Table B-5 through a constant
sample setup of the benchmark model and Figure B-1 through a exclusion of a single
observation. The main results are fully supported.
5.1. Alternative regressors
Table 6 explores the role of a complementary set of regressors. We first introduce two
new proxies for the funding of SWFs, namely the current account balance, stock of gov-
ernment debt, the net financial assets (NFA) and the foreign exchange reserves (FXRes).
As diﬀerent measures for economic surpluses, we expect current account surpluses and
large positive net financial assets to be positively correlated to the probability of set-
ting up an SWF, while debt should be negatively correlated corresponding to Hypothesis
4. We then also include a measure for economic risk, corresponding to Hypothesis 5.
We use the 20-years standard deviation of GDP per capita, σ2(GDP), and the 20-years
standard deviation of natural resource rents, σ2(Rents), as proxies for the future uncer-
tainty.19 Volatility in the economy or from the resource rents would work as an incentive
to additional precautionary saving. In order to achieve the most stable income stream
from volatile receipts safe foreign investments would be related positively to setting up
an SWF, rather than absorb such flows in the domestic economy. However, volatility
might also give scope to abuse as changing prices and production give opportunity for
back-channelling receipts to those in power.20
We find in Table 6 that these additional regressors do not bring much to the bench-
mark model. They are mostly not statistically significant, meaning that natural resource
rents and log GDP per capita are suﬃcient to capture the funding component, and that
19We experimented with shorter samples, which give qualitatively similar results.
20Ideally, we may wish to use more recent measures of volatility or even of expected volatility as a
better measure for uncertainty. As of yet we have no such measures available. In contrast, 20 years past
data should give a very conservative estimate for this uncertainty measure.
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Table 6: Alternative regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
swf swf swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.207*** 0.217*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.253*** 0.218***
(0.053) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.065) (0.053)
Log GDPpc 1.299*** 1.326*** 1.520*** 1.479*** 1.431*** 1.399***
(0.310) (0.337) (0.348) (0.314) (0.327) (0.360)
Non-democrat 2.976*** 3.123*** 3.276*** 3.384*** 3.748*** 3.106***
(1.006) (1.049) (1.036) (1.053) (0.960) (0.973)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.181*** -0.188*** -0.199*** -0.202*** -0.236*** -0.197***
(0.060) (0.065) (0.058) (0.058) (0.066) (0.057)
Curr. Acc. (% GDP) 0.020
(0.030)
DebtGDP -0.010
(0.014)
NFA 0.060
(0.476)
FXRes (% GDP) -3.239
(3.450)
σ2(GDP) 2.876
(2.605)
σ2(Rents) 0.131
(0.602)
Constant -15.630*** -15.409*** -17.728*** -17.121*** -18.462*** -16.749***
(3.252) (3.663) (3.627) (3.289) (3.420) (3.456)
Observations 142 148 147 148 160 149
n. SWFs 15 16 16 16 16 16
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31
ll -33.19 -33.74 -34.29 -34.28 -34.68 -35.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
uncertainty plays no clear role on the emergence of SWFs in the sample.21 Surprisingly,
the debt stock appears to play no general role in the prediction for an SWF.22
Finally, we may suspect that income per capita will not capture to what extent this
income is spread over the entire population, whereas oil rents are often concentrated
towards an elite. Hence, we may suspect that in societies where income or wealth is
more unequally distributed are more likely to set up an SWF as the elite will make
this decision for themselves rather than for the people. Alternatively, one may expect
that more equal societies may indicate better economic institutions that would induce
21Other variables were included of which results are not presented, such as household consumption as
precentage of GDP (in case there is a trade oﬀ between government and private household spending and
savings, as well as gross savings as a percentage of GDP. Neither were significant nor aﬀected the other
variables. Table B-3 presents the same models in the extended benchmark model that includes general
government and education expenditures. The conclusions do not change materially
22Table B-4 in the appendix presents further results with respect to the debt variable. We find that
only in a more limited sample is debt able to predict the probability of an SWF.
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Table 7: Alternative regressors based on Gini Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
reduced sample
swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.236*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.235***
(0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068)
Log GDPpc 2.060*** 2.337*** 2.282***
(0.689) (0.847) (0.824)
Non-democrat 3.015** 3.617*** 3.507*** 3.419***
(1.307) (1.281) (1.268) (1.280)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.177** -0.169** -0.169** -0.175**
(0.081) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079)
Gov. cons. -0.190** -0.169** -0.172** -0.182**
(0.085) (0.070) (0.072) (0.075)
Gini index 0.069*
(0.039)
log(100-Gini) -3.346
(2.053)
log Gini-corrected GDPpc 2.280***
(0.813)
Constant -19.830*** -25.701*** -8.682 -12.817***
(5.980) (9.037) (6.559) (4.149)
Observations 98 98 98 98
n. SWFs 11 11 11 11
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.39
ll -21.62 -20.70 -20.90 -20.98
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
long term planning, among which an SWF. Table 7 shows that inequality -as measured
by the GINI-coeﬃcient- seems to play no role. Part of the explanation for the lack of
explanatory power of the Gini coeﬃcient and of Gini-adjusted GDP per capita measures
may be due to the reduced sample, whereby predominantly the most unequal societies
drop out of the sample for lack of data. Still, given that the other variables remain
robustly significant lead us to conclude that we have no evidence that income inequality
improves our understanding of the establishment of SWFs.
5.2. Alternative measures
We present some alternatives in the measures of the rents in Table 8. The World
Bank provides figures for oil and gas separately. We find that the mechanism holds for
both types of rents, but is stronger for natural gas. The sample size is greatly reduced for
this measure, nonetheless the estimates are very much in line with the main results. For
models (2) and (4) a joint-test on the coeﬃcients on Government expenditures excluding
education and education expenditures give p-values of 0.020 and 0.001 respectively, fully
supporting the benchmark result.
Additionally, we created our own resource wealth measure based on trade statistics,
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Table 8: Alternative resource measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
swf swf swf swf swf swf
Natural Gas Rents 1.077*** 1.093**
(0.333) (0.447)
Oil Rents 0.447*** 0.366**
(0.130) (0.150)
Commodity Ex. 0.040** 0.040**
(0.018) (0.019)
Log GDPpc 0.914*** 1.433*** 0.935*** 1.250*** 1.381*** 1.860***
(0.295) (0.456) (0.320) (0.447) (0.312) (0.429)
Non-democrat 2.751*** 2.305 2.570*** 2.443* 2.459 4.910*
(0.869) (1.484) (0.902) (1.479) (2.067) (2.925)
Non-democrat × Gas rents -1.075*** -0.662
(0.335) (0.519)
Non-democrat × Oil rents -0.425*** -0.336**
(0.133) (0.154)
Non-democrat × Com. Exp -0.015 -0.050
(0.028) (0.038)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.189 -0.219* -0.227**
(0.118) (0.125) (0.098)
Edu. exp. -0.561 -0.441 -0.471
(0.456) (0.381) (0.321)
Constant -11.551*** -12.194*** -11.865*** -10.714*** -17.197*** -17.320***
(3.072) (3.593) (3.283) (3.451) (3.628) (3.838)
Observations 112 92 113 93 150 111
n. SWFs 16 11 16 11 16 11
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.40 0.30 0.42 0.22 0.32
ll -33.53 -20.13 -32.06 -19.72 -39.84 -24.22
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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which measures the percentage of primary commodities in total trade. One drawback of
the rents measure is that it does not capture whether the resource is used for domestic
consumption or mostly exported, while SWFs are often related to exported commodities.
We find that the export measure oﬀers consistent results. In a reduced benchmark model,
which excludes some government expenditure measures, and has a larger sample size, the
regime variable is no longer significant. However, for the larger benchmark model, and the
smaller sample, the results are entirely in line with what we found before (a joint-test on
government expenditures excluding education and education expenditures gives a p-value
of 0.014). Nevertheless, the impact of commodity exports is distinctively smaller, and
coeﬃcient on the interaction with regime type does not indicate the same relation as we
find for the resource rents.
5.3. Political channels
Table 9 looks further into the channels of the regime determinants on Sovereign Wealth
Fund. We present the regression of the benchmark model while replacing the original
non-democratic dummy with measures found in the PolityIV dataset. As documented
above, theoretical papers tend to predict that government accountability and property
rights are the key channels through which political decision making takes place. In fact,
it appears that several of the factors in the PolityIV dataset play a role, in particular
factors determining the structure of the highest government position, but also the role
of political opposition. We note that for these variables the coeﬃcients on the other
variables are hardly aﬀected, showing that the model in general is very robust. (Signs of
the coeﬃcients on rents and its interaction are occasionally reversed due to the way the
qualitative indicators are measured.)
These findings are in line with the theoretical predictions discussed before, in particular
with respect to the extent of government accountability to policies for the long term benefit
of the country. The results give further strong evidence that government characteristics
are related to the establishment of SWFs. However, not all of the governance measures
give statistically significant results, or they strongly aﬀect the coeﬃcients of the other
variables. We also looked at various measures on the duration of governments. We expect
that one way to capture the future horizon that a ruler considers when making savings
and investment decisions is the stability of the regime to date. We failed to find evidence
that such duration measures could predict the decision to setup an SWF (not shown).
5.4. Alternative dependent variable
In this subsection we aim to further indicate whether the establishment of an SWF is
distinct from the financial position of a country. In Table 6, we already showed that macro-
financial variables (debt, NFA) have hardly any explanatory power for establishment of an
SWF. If anything, there may be an intuitive positive contribution. In Table 10 we follow
up on this by making the net foreign asset position and the foreign exchange reserves (both
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Table 9: Political Channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
nondemocrat1998 xrreg xrcomp xropen xconst
VARIABLES swf swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.262*** -0.258** -0.024 0.005 -0.072
(0.058) (0.111) (0.041) (0.032) (0.048)
Log GDPpc 1.954*** 3.129*** 2.649*** 1.647*** 2.677***
(0.390) (0.784) (0.567) (0.480) (0.627)
polity var 3.926*** -6.425*** -2.453*** -0.793** -1.248***
(1.172) (1.394) (0.475) (0.340) (0.289)
polity var × Rents -0.241*** 0.156*** 0.063*** 0.026 0.043**
(0.066) (0.054) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017)
Gov. cons. -0.249*** -0.228*** -0.273*** -0.232*** -0.281***
(0.071) (0.074) (0.082) (0.076) (0.089)
Constant -18.468*** -12.693*** -17.822*** -11.356*** -16.979***
(3.545) (4.563) (3.879) (2.976) (4.031)
Observations 149 130 130 130 130
n. SWFs 16 16 16 16 16
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.56 0.48 0.32 0.50
ll -29.66 -21.27 -25.25 -32.74 -24.29
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
parreg parcomp exrec exconst polcomp
VARIABLES swf swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.155** -0.172* -0.062 -0.072 -0.073
(0.074) (0.095) (0.069) (0.048) (0.051)
Log GDPpc 1.519*** 3.071*** 1.976*** 2.677*** 2.540***
(0.513) (0.665) (0.431) (0.627) (0.547)
polity var -0.313 -2.228*** -0.771*** -1.248*** -0.732***
(0.375) (0.511) (0.208) (0.289) (0.190)
polity var × Rents -0.022 0.103*** 0.024* 0.043** 0.036***
(0.021) (0.040) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013)
Gov. cons. -0.212*** -0.278*** -0.276*** -0.281*** -0.267***
(0.065) (0.078) (0.088) (0.089) (0.077)
Constant -12.299*** -19.279*** -11.621*** -16.979*** -17.114***
(3.861) (4.183) (2.868) (4.031) (3.526)
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
n. SWFs 16 16 16 16 16
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.51 0.39 0.50 0.48
ll -33.82 -23.77 -29.41 -24.29 -25.41
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The polity variables indicated at the top of each model are: (2) xrreg: regulation
of chief executive recruitment, (3) xrcomp: competitiveness of executive recruit-
ment, (4) xropen: openness of executive recruitment, (5) xconst: executive con-
straints (decision rules), (6) parreg: regulation of participation, (7) parcomp: the
competitiveness of participation, (8) exrec: executive recruitment concept, (9) ex-
const: executive constraints concept, (10) polcomp political competition concept.
See Marshall et al. (2006) for details.
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Table 10: Alternative dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FXRes FXRes NFA NFA
Rents (%GDP) -0.000 0.001 0.013 -0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.011)
Log GDPpc 0.006 0.007 0.427** 0.119**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.182) (0.047)
Non-democrat 0.015 0.062* 0.676 -0.026
(0.025) (0.037) (0.480) (0.167)
Non-democrat × Rents 0.001 -0.006** -0.064 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.039) (0.015)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. 0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.007)
Edu. exp. 0.001 -0.007
(0.003) (0.008)
Curr. acc. (% GDP) -0.003* 0.026***
(0.002) (0.008)
Constant 0.052 -0.009 -4.302** -1.248***
(0.056) (0.071) (1.670) (0.412)
Observations 152 114 151 113
R-squared 0.010 0.171 0.340 0.493
n. SWFs 20 15 20 15
r2 a -0.02 0.12 0.32 0.46
ll 139.83 128.87 -214.12 -69.31
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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stock measures) the dependent variables. If country wide savings decision are taken based
on the determinants we found before, then these same variables should have explanatory
power in model with those variables on the left hand side. Since the net foreign assets
and the foreign exchange reserves are continuous variables we can use simple OLS to
estimate these models. As in the previous tables, we indicate for the sample the number
of countries that have an SWF.
The results indicate that the variables we identified as explanatory variables for the
SWFs, have in general much less if any explanatory power on the status of a country’s
financial position. The exception is GDP per capita and the current account, which
contribute significantly and positively to the net foreign asset position. Their appears
some correlation between the the polity variable in combination with rents for the foreign
exchange reserves, where non-democracies hold on average 6.2% higher reserves decreasing
with rents (model 2). However overall, if a country’s economic policy, including national
savings is a political decision we might have expected that education expenditures, rents
as well as the government characters were strongly related to these measures. We find
no strong evidence for this in contrast to the models on SWF establishment. Therefore,
these results indicate that the emergence of SWFs is the result of a very diﬀerent process
than only balancing savings with respect to the rest of the world.
5.5. Duration analysis
Our data also allows us to do duration analysis, where we model the distribution of
the time it takes to set up an SWF. Technically, we interpret our data as a stock sample
with right censoring, since we take all countries that have no SWF in 1997, as the start
of the spell, while not all countries will set up an SWF at the time our time period
of analysis ends. For this reason duration models are interesting in our case since the
feature of censoring allows us to take into account those countries without an SWF. We
will present here just standard (parametric) duration models that fall in the proportional
hazard class. The proportional hazard models imply that our covariates of interest are
limited in shifting the hazard function (interpretable as the probability of failure at date
t, given survival up to t− 1) up or down over the entire time scale (i.e. the proportional
eﬀect of covariates do not change over time).
We report in Table 11 diﬀerent specifications. We report coeﬃcients. The eﬀect of
on the hazard function can be found by taking exp(β) − 1. Positive coeﬃcient shift
the hazard function upwards, indicating an increased probability of setting up an SWF
relative to the baseline. The Cox and Weibull models are reported in columns (1) and
(2) and lead to conclusions similar to those obtained in the benchmark table with a
positive impact of funding (GDP per capita and resource rents are significant) and of
autocracy, an interaction term between autocracy and resource rents that indicate that
resources no longer matter in an autocratic country and a negative impact of government
expenses (same results for education expenses - not reported in the Table). For the sake
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Table 11: Duration analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES cox full full democrat autocrat short sample
Rents (%GDP) 0.150*** 0.162*** 0.177*** 0.080*** 0.030** 0.155***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.039) (0.025) (0.015) (0.032)
Log GDPpc 1.253*** 1.331*** 1.533*** 1.440*** 1.041*** 1.270***
(0.249) (0.250) (0.394) (0.403) (0.319) (0.245)
Non-democrat 1.981*** 2.148*** 2.439** 2.040***
(0.695) (0.696) (0.996) (0.692)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.123*** -0.135*** -0.151*** -0.128***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.035)
Edu. exp. -0.200
(0.205)
Gov. exp. ex. edu. -0.019
(0.057)
Gov. cons. -0.080* -0.080* -0.151** -0.038 -0.082*
(0.048) (0.047) (0.073) (0.055) (0.048)
Constant -16.834*** -18.851*** -16.392*** -12.415*** -16.453***
(2.571) (4.109) (3.996) (2.857) (2.470)
Observations 153 153 119 106 47 153
N. SWF 21 21 16 11 10 21
ll -85.847 -66.837 -51.753 -38.838 -30.456 -62.134
α 1.031 0.966 0.961 0.909 1.254
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of comparability with previous tables, the last column restricts the data on SWFs to the
1998-2008 periods, which keeps results unchanged, but increases slightly the estimates for
the unconditional trend, suggesting that more and more SWFs are likely to be observed
as time passes. However, comparing αˆ among the diﬀerent models, indicates that the
rate of SWF establishments is neither increasing nor decreasing with time (none of the
estimated parameters is significantly diﬀerent from 1).
6. Predictions and characteristics
The limited number of existing or newly established funds precludes making good
statistical inference on them. Nevertheless it is revealing to look graphically to some of
their characteristics in relation to the results we found above.
Firstly, we calculated the predicted probability for the establishment/existence of an
SWF from Table 4 model (3). Subsequently, we plot this probability against the total
size, fraction in foreign assets, accountability/transparency and behaviour. All the data
come from Truman (2008), where the latter are ratings determined on publicly available
information on their investment and reporting quality. We include in the plots all funds,
including those established before 1998 as well as pension funds, allowing the observation
of diﬀerence between such funds with respect to recent resource funded SWFs.
We see in the upper left plot that size is not related to the probability of the SWFs
(ignoring the Singapore, which actually has no natural resource rents, there is no real
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities vs. SWF characteristics
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Note: Probabilities based on the model presented in Table 4 (4). Rectangles indicate pension
funds, X-axis predicted probability comes from Table 4 model (3). Y-axis variables come from
Truman (2008).
pattern).23 This is interesting since the size of resource rents by itself was found to be
positively related. In general, countries with some of the largest rents have a fund that
is actually rather small. The largest funds, outside the Gulf countries, are dominated by
western countries and China. The portion of assets invested abroad is 100% for quite
some of the funds. Interestingly, western funds and China hold a significant fraction
of their assets in domestic assets, except Norway. For the United States and Japan
this makes sense as a global investment fund naturally includes a sizeable fraction of
their own economy, while for smaller countries a global fund would have most assets
abroad. However, this over-reliance could also indicate the lack of possibilities to invest
domestically, which might be a valid explanation for Russia, Kazakhstan, Trinidad and
Tobago, Iran and Venezuela. These countries might not be normally associated with
capital scarcity, but known to be related to significant diﬃculties in establishing private
and public sector investment opportunities.
23Reproducing this plot in terms of assets/GDP does not improve the presentation nor changes the
pattern.
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Figure 3: predicted probabilities for all countries
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Circles indicate existing funds, both established before and after 1998. Here we
compare “false positives’ with “correct negatives” and “correct positives”.
With respect to the quality of these funds construct and behaviour there is interesting
pattern as well. Those countries with a high predicted probability of an SWF tend to
have decreasing scores on the measures of accountability/transparency and behaviour.
Pension funds score generally higher on these ratings than SWFs. It serves as a stark
contract that those countries that have the highest prediction have the lowest scores on
their quality standards, relative to those countries that have the lowest prediction but
actually do have fund.
Finally, it is interesting to include all the data, meaning all the countries even if no
fund exist. Figure 3 can reveal the false positives, as well as correct negatives. On the
“false positives” side, say above 50%, we have Turkmenistan (TKM), Indonesia (IDN)
and Egypt (EGY). Just below that cut-oﬀ there is Papua New Guinea (PNG).
On the side of correct negatives we have Angola, Republic of Congo and Equitorial
Guinea with sizeable resource rents but no SWF, while the predicted probability is also
low.24 The score for Angola is low because the resource rent impact is cancelled out by
its non-democratic structure. It scores below average on the education, spending around
2.5% of GDP. A similar explanation holds for Congo, which on top of that has a lower
income per capita measure.
24Angola actually has set up an SWF in 2012, so fell out of our estimation sample of 1998-2008.
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In this graph it is also interesting to see the low probability of Azerbaijan (AZE).
Its sizeable resource rents are predicted to be used domestically rather than for a fund.
Compare this with the plots of Figure 2. The Azerbaijani SWF is small, completely into
foreign assets and rather well organised. It appears to be ready to become a quality SWF
once domestic opportunities for capital deepening are no longer necessary.
7. Conclusion
We presented evidence on the determinants for the establishment of Sovereign Wealth
Funds. Based on recent literature of optimal policies for savings and investments of
resource rich countries, we hypothesised the role of the key variables. We find, in line with
the theory that, both economic and political aspects play an important role and interact.
The observation that SWFs are related to non-democratic countries has triggered fears
on their intention and goals. However, the reason for the establishment of SWFs appears
strongly related to the domestic characteristics, including the economic opportunities,
which in turn are related to how a country is organised politically. Democratic countries
will have the mechanisms to direct windfalls to productive domestic uses which reduces
the need for a fund full of foreign assets. Autocratic countries tend to create barriers
for domestic private enterprises and often have purposely less well arranged public goods.
SWFs then serve as an option for the elite to appear pragmatic but might just as well be
related to the inability or unwillingness to make real changes at home. In contrast, in our
estimations we find no strong evidence of the role of economic volatility or government
indebtedness on the decision to setup an SWF.
The evidence presented here is in line with theoretical models that suggest that re-
source windfalls can be used in capital scarce countries to jump-start economic devel-
opment. However, as in the debate on foreign aid, significant barriers for investment in
public goods and the private sector may prohibit such beneficial uses. Instead SWF are
nothing else than a failure of governments to share with their citizens the natural richness
a country possesses.
For receivers of SWFs investments it may be relevant to appreciate these features. The
results in this paper indicate that SWFs are phenomena of their origin, both economically
and politically. As long as SWF home countries do not enact policies to stimulate growth,
such funds will be around for a while.
We base these conclusions on a carefully executed econometric analysis given the data
that we aimed to be include as many countries as possible. Admittedly, some of the
variables that we looked at, including the dependent variable, may only be proxies of the
variables that we are really interested in. Additionally, although we are able to identify
factors that aﬀect whether countries establish a SWF, and in extension how they manage
their natural resources, the precise mechanism that work through these factors are not
identified. Our results indicate that future research may very well successfully look further
31
into the determinants and mechanisms of countries’ resource management policies.
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AppendixA. SWFs Overview and Data sources
Table A-1: Assets (in billion USD) and inception of the 50 largest SWFs, as of end 2013
Ranking Country SWF Assets Year Inception>1997?
1 Norway Government Pension Fund - Global 818 1990 0
2 Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings 675.9 n/a 1
3 UAE - Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 627 1976 0
4 China China Investment Corporation 575.2 2007 1
5 China SAFE Investment company 567.9 1997 0
6 Kuwait Kuwait Investment authority 386 1953 0
7 Hong-Kong HK Monetary Authority 326.7 1993 0
8 Singapore Government of Singapore Investment corporation 285 1981 0
9 Singapore Temasek Holdings 173.3 1974 0
10 Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 170 2005 1
11 China National Social Security Fund 160.6 2000 1
12 Australia Australian Future Fund 88.7 2006 1
13 Russia National Welfare Fund 88 2008 1
14 Russia Reserve Fund 86.4 2008 1
15 Kazakhstan Samruk-Kazyna JSC 77.5 2008 1
16 Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 77.2 2000 1
17 UAE- Duba Investment Corporation of Duba 70 2006 1
18 Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 68.9 2000 1
19 UAE - Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment Company 65.3 1984 0
20 Libya Libyan Investment Authority 65 2006 1
21 South Korea Korean Investment Corporation 56.6 2005 1
22 UAE - Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company 55.5 2002 1
23 Iran National Development Fund of Iran 54 2011 1
24 US - Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund 46.8 1976 0
25 Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 40 1983 0
26 Malaysia Khasanah Nasional 39.1 1993 0
27 Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 34.1 1999 1
28 France Strategic Investment Fund 25.5 2008 1
29 US - Texas Texas Permanent School Fund 25.5 1854 0
30 Kazakhstan National Investment Corporation 20 2012 1
31 Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund 19.4 2001 1
32 New Zealand NZ Superannuation Fund 19.3 2003 1
33 Iraq Development Fund for Iraq 18 2003 1
34 US - New Mexico New Mexico State Investment Council 17.3 1958 0
35 Canada Alberta’s Heritage Fund 16.4 1976 0
36 US - Texas Permanent University Fund 15.3 1876 0
37 Chile Social and Economic Stabilization Fund 15.2 2007 1
38 East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 14.6 2005 1
39 Russia Russian Direct Investment Fund 13 2011 1
40 UAE - Federal Emirates Investment Authority 10 2007 1
41 Oman State General Reserve Fund 8.2 1980 0
42 Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 7.1 2006 1
43 Peru Fiscal stabilization Fund 7.1 1999 1
44 Chile Pension Reserve Fund 7 2006 1
45 Botswana Pula Fund 6.9 1994 0
46 Mexico Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund of Mexico 6 2000 1
47 Oman Oman Investment Fund 6 2006 1
48 Italy Italian Strategic Fund 6 2011 1
49 US - Wyoming Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund 5.6 1974 0
50 Brazil Sovereign fund of Brazil 5.3 2008 1
TOTAL 6073.40 32
Notes: This information about the 50 largest Sovereign Wealth Funds is compiled from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute,
http://wwww.swfinstitute.org (accessed on January 15, 2014).
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Table A-2: Data Description
Variable Description Source
SWF Country dummy equal to 1 if the country established
his first SWF in the 1998-2008 period, to 0 otherwise
Truman (2008) and
www.swfinstitute.org
Rents Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) WB WDI (ny.gdp.totl.rt.zs)
Log GDPpc log GDP per Capita, constant US$, millions WB indicators (GDPPCKD)
Non-democrat. Country dummy equal to 1 if polity2 is smaller or equal
to 0, to 0 otherwise
Polity IV Project
Edu. exp. Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) WB WDI (se.xpd.totl.gd.zs)
Gov. cons. General government final consumption expenditure (%
of GDP)
WB WDI (ne.con.govt.zs)
Curr. acc. Current Account Balance, %GDP WB indicators (bncabfundcd)
Debt Sovereign debt (% of GDP) Abbas et al. (2010)
NFA Net Financial Assets, excluding gold (% of GDP) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) as up-
dated/extended
FXRes Foreign Exchange reserves, excluding gold (% of GDP) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) as up-
dated/extended
σ2(GDP ) Coeﬃcient of variation of GDP over 1978-1998 WB WDI (ny.gdp.mktp.cd)
σ2(Rents) Coeﬃcient of variation of Rents over 1978-1998 WB WDI (ny.gdp.totl.rt.zs)
Gini GINI index WB WDI (si.pov.gini)
Log GDPpc/(100-Gini) logarithm of GDP per capita as divided by (100-Gini) WB WDI (si.pov.gini and GDP-
PCKD)
Natural gas rents Natural gas rents (% of GDP) WB WDI (ny.gdp.ngas.rt.zs)
Oil rents Oil rents (% of GDP) WB WDI (ny.gdp.petr.rt.zs)
Commodity Exp. Primary commodities (% total exports) over 1995-
1998
UNCTADstat (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 +
4 + 68)
xrreg regulation of chief executive recruitment Polity IV Project
xrcomp competitiveness of executive recruitment Polity IV Project
xropen openness of executive recruitmente Polity IV Project
xconst executive constraints (decision rules) Polity IV Project
parreg regulation of participation Polity IV Project
parcomp the competitiveness of participation Polity IV Project
exrec executive recruitment concept Polity IV Project
exconst executive constraints concept Polity IV Project
polcomp political competition concept Polity IV Project
Note. The regressions are performed on 5-year averages (1994-1998) of the explanatory variables (Rents, Log GDPpc,
Edu. exp., Gov. cons., Curr. acc., Debt, NFA, FXRes, Gini, Log GDPpc/(100-Gini), Natural gas rents, Oil rents).
Since UNCTAD data are only available from 1995, Commodity Exp. is a 4-year average (1995-1998).
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AppendixB. Additional results
Table B-1: Forms of log GDPpc and Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.245*** 0.239*** 0.305*** 0.279***
(0.061) (0.063) (0.078) (0.088)
Log GDPpc 1.756*** 12.837* 2.297*** 1.961***
(0.438) (6.574) (0.614) (0.511)
(Log GDPpc)2 -0.617*
(0.351)
Non-democrat 3.279* 3.085 5.385** 3.101
(1.782) (1.947) (2.115) (2.108)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.222*** -0.218** -0.279** -0.195
(0.082) (0.085) (0.112) (0.121)
Edu. exp. -0.509 -0.498 8.313** -0.489
(0.422) (0.501) (3.299) (0.395)
(Edu. exp.)2 -1.408***
(0.483)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.198 -0.192 -0.303 3.165**
(0.123) (0.134) (0.232) (1.379)
(Gov. exp. excl. edu.)2 -0.178**
(0.081)
Constant -16.037*** -65.275** -33.276*** -32.934***
(3.828) (30.288) (7.529) (9.631)
Observations 115 115 115 115
n. SWFs 11 11 11 11
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.46 0.56 0.53
ll -20.89 -19.70 -15.84 -17.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B-2: Interaction with rents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
interaction variable Rents Log GDPpc Non-democrat Gov. cons
Rents (%GDP) 0.311*** -1.518* 0.262*** 0.033
(0.104) (0.893) (0.058) (0.081)
Log GDPpc 1.753*** 0.399 1.954*** 1.384***
(0.383) (0.436) (0.390) (0.311)
Non-democrat 0.868 1.367* 3.926*** 1.341
(1.003) (0.730) (1.172) (0.939)
interaction var. × Rents -0.005*** 0.185* -0.241*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.103) (0.066) (0.004)
Gov. cons. -0.213*** -0.196*** -0.249*** -0.237***
(0.071) (0.066) (0.071) (0.081)
Constant -16.844*** -3.921 -18.468*** -12.080***
(3.799) (3.425) (3.545) (2.605)
Observations 149 149 149 149
n. SWFs 16 16 16 16
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.29
ll -29.68 -29.09 -29.66 -36.31
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B-3: Alternative results Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
swf swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.235*** 0.292*** 0.243*** 0.289*** 0.242***
(0.059) (0.093) (0.060) (0.065) (0.060)
Log GDPpc 1.754*** 1.811*** 1.884*** 1.671*** 1.858***
(0.478) (0.555) (0.472) (0.481) (0.499)
Non-democrat 2.980* 3.251* 3.256* 3.727** 3.301*
(1.690) (1.837) (1.894) (1.721) (1.799)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.190** -0.219** -0.217** -0.274*** -0.221***
(0.077) (0.097) (0.085) (0.091) (0.082)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.197 -0.136 -0.222 -0.234** -0.173
(0.143) (0.135) (0.144) (0.119) (0.117)
Edu. exp. -0.539 -0.749* -0.514 -0.372 -0.548
(0.423) (0.454) (0.438) (0.380) (0.427)
Curr. Acc. (% GDP) 0.027
(0.038)
NFA (% GDP) 1.762
(1.205)
FXRes (% GDP) 0.366
(4.191)
σ2(GDP) 3.608
(3.049)
σ2(Rents) -0.367
(0.413)
Constant -15.695*** -15.889*** -16.895*** -17.209*** -16.800***
(3.929) (4.753) (3.917) (4.176) (4.277)
Observations 110 112 113 115 112
n. SWFs 11 11 11 11 11
Pseudo R2 0.44 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.42
ll -20.14 -18.50 -20.32 -20.09 -20.69
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B-4: Additional results Table 6, Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.217*** 0.257*** 0.335*** 0.357***
(0.056) (0.060) (0.098) (0.107)
Log GDPpc 1.326*** 1.891*** 1.421** 1.148**
(0.337) (0.494) (0.604) (0.576)
Non-democrat 3.123*** 3.915*** 2.389 2.270*
(1.049) (1.250) (1.535) (1.323)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.188*** -0.231*** -0.202** -0.234**
(0.065) (0.073) (0.093) (0.105)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.248**
(0.112)
Edu. exp. -0.284
(0.300)
Debt -0.010 -0.010 -0.072*** -0.064***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.025) (0.018)
Gov. cons. -0.270***
(0.087)
Constant -15.409*** -16.920*** -10.884** -12.250**
(3.663) (4.536) (5.379) (5.738)
Observations 148 143 112 112
n. SWFs 16 16 11 11
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.44 0.61 0.53
ll -33.74 -27.94 -14.06 -16.94
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B-5: Additional results Table 4: constant sample size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES swf swf swf swf swf swf
Rents (%GDP) 0.245*** 0.252*** 0.240*** 0.267*** 0.259*** 0.063*
(0.061) (0.066) (0.058) (0.063) (0.065) (0.033)
Log GDPpc 1.756*** 1.458*** 1.654*** 1.842*** 1.390*** 0.786***
(0.438) (0.410) (0.395) (0.471) (0.392) (0.230)
Non-democrat 3.279* 2.601** 2.931** 3.720** 2.843** 0.226
(1.782) (1.262) (1.292) (1.578) (1.166) (1.139)
Non-democrat× Rents -0.222*** -0.219*** -0.204*** -0.267*** -0.235***
(0.082) (0.072) (0.065) (0.077) (0.068)
Edu. exp. -0.509 -0.733**
(0.422) (0.318)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.198 -0.073*
(0.123) (0.043)
Gov. cons. -0.261***
(0.075)
Constant -16.037*** -16.461*** -15.348*** -18.145*** -16.700*** -9.906***
(3.828) (4.284) (3.539) (4.255) (4.185) (2.257)
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115
n. SWFs 11 11 11 11 11 11
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.34 0.42 0.38 0.31 0.16
ll -20.89 -24.04 -21.17 -22.31 -25.07 -30.43
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure B-1: Robustness check - sensibility to country exclusion
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Note: graphs indicate coeﬃcient on the regressors whilst excluding one observation per es-
timation, shaded area is 95% confidence interval. The variables refer to the five regressors
in the benchmark model, non-democrat is the dummy, ”rent nond” is the interaction of non-
democracy with rents, ”edu” is educational expenditures and ”GExp exEdu” is Government
consumption excluding education. Results seem generally stable, the occasional peaks are
predominantly away from zero.
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